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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
DODGE TOWN, INC.,
a Utah Corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
VERNON B. ROMNEY,
Attorney General, State of Utah,
GORDON B. CHRISTENSEN,
County Attorney, Salt Lake
County, and DELMAR L.
LARSON, Sheriff of
Salt Lake County,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.

12044

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
APPEARANCE OF AMICUS CURIAE
Statements of the kind of case, of the disposition in the lower court and of the relief sought on
appeal are set forth in Respondent's brief.
Morris Motors is engaged in the business of selling new and used motor vehicles at Provo, Utah, under and by virtue of the license issued by the Motor
Vehicle Division of the State Tax Commission of the
State of Utah.
Morris Motors' petition for leave to appear in
these proceedings and to file a brief amicus curiae
1

"·as granted by this Honorable Court by order entered June 20, 1970.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
It will be the purpose of Morris Motors, by this
brief, to perform the usual function of amicus curiae.
That is, to aid the Court on questions of law; and
further to call to the attention of this Honorable
Court certain facts and circumstances which should
be helpful. The Respondent, in its brief, has set forth
the facts as presented and introduced at the trial

1

It is the position of Morris Motors that Title 76,
Chapter 55, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. is constitutional and that the Trial Court should
be sustained. It is the further purpose of this brief
to cite those cases and the statutes involved that suppol't the proposition that this statute herein involved
is constitutional and that the Legislature of the state
of Utah had the power and the authority to enact the
same, and tha:t it did so within the constitutional limitations of the state of Utah.

ARGUMENT

POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT
THE STATUTE IN QUESTION IS NOT AN UNREASONABLE EXERCISE OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWER, AND THAT IT WAS WITHIN
ITS LEGISLATIVE PREROGATIVE TO ENACT
TITLE 76, CHAPTER 55.

It is the Appellant's contention and its basis of '
an appeal from the decision of the Trial Court that
2

l

the following provisions of the statute are unconstitutional inasmuch as they violate certain provisions
of the Constitution of the state of Utah, and for the
convenience of the Court we are setting forth the provisions of the statute under attack:
"76-55-6. Motor vehicle sales - Sunday
transactions by licensees prohibited - Misdemeanor. - Any person holding a license
under the terms and provisions of section 413-6, who shall carry on or engage or represent
or advertise that he is engaged or intends to
engage in the business of buying, selling, exchanging, dealing in or trading in new or used
motor vehicles at retail; or who shall open any
place of business or lot where he attempts to
or does engage in the business of buying, selling, exchanging, dealing or trading in new or
used motor vehicles at retail; or who shall open
any place of business or lot where he attempts
to or does engage in the business of buying,
selling, exchanging, dealing or trading in new
or used motor vehicles at retail; or who does
buy, sell, exchange, deal or trade in new or
used motor vehicles at retails as a business on
the first day of the week, commonly known
and designated as Sunday, is guilty of a misdemeanor."
"76-55-7. Motor vehicle sales - Convictions - Suspension or revocation of license.
- Courts having jurisdiction over offenses
committed by license holders in violation of
section 76-55-5, shall forward a record of conviction to the administrator of the motor vehicle dealers of this state within ten days following conviction. Upon receipt of a second
record of conviction, the administrator of the
3

motm vehicle dealers shall suspend the holder's
for a
of thirty days, and
upon receipt of a third record of conviction of
a license holder, the administrator of the motor vehicle dealers administration shall permanently revoke the holder's license."
It will be noted that the foregoing sections of the
statute apply and are limited solely to those who are
required to be licensed in the sale of motor vehicles
pm·suant to Section 41-3-6, Utah Code Annotated
1953, as amended.

The legislature has seen fit to regulate the sale
of motor vehicles and has enacted the various provisions of Title 41, Chapter 3, for the protection of the
public and its welfare.
Title 41, Chapter 3 is a very comprehensive regulatory statute, regulating the sale of motor vehicles
by dealers and requiring a license to do business not
only for themeslves, but for their salesmen. It has
been a part of the Utah Code for many years; subsequent amendments have been made, expanding the
coverage and the regulation of the sale of motor vehicles from time to time. This act covers almost every
phase of the sale and use of automobiles and is designed to protect the public, not only in the sale of
motor vehicles, but in the advertising by dealers.
Motor vehicle dealers must be licensed under the
te1·ms of the act, as well as the salesmen. This act
provides for the appointment of an administrator
who has certain powers and duties in the enforce4

ment of the provisions of the act. He has the power
to ref use or issue licenses; the power to revoke for
just cause. Section 41-3-8.
The legislature has enacted Section 41-3-8, pro\'iding for an administrator. The administrator's
power and duties are specifically set forth and enumerated in said Section 41-3-8.
Section 41-3-12 sets forth and enumerates
classes of licenses issued under the provisions of the
act.
Section 41-3-16 and 17 provides for the requirement of a bond in the amount of $5,000.00 for dealers, and $1,000.00 for salesmen, conditioned that the
dealer or salesman shall conduct his business as a
dealer or salesman without fraud or fraudulent representation, and without the violation of any of the
provisions of the act, Title 41, Chapter 3.
Section 41-3-23 sets forth and enumerates the
prohibited acts or omissions of licensees. These include the prohibition of intentionally publishing, displaying 01· circulating any advertising which is misleading or inaccurate in any material particular or
which misrepresents any of the products sold, manufactured, handled, or furnished by a licensee. The
dealer cannot dismantle or wreck any motor vehicle
without first obtaining a dismantling permit; he
must give notice of sales or transfers as required by
the act. He cannot advertise or otherwise represent,
or knowingly allow to be advertised or represented,
5

on his behalf or at his place of business, that no down
payment is in fact required and the buyer is advised
01· induced to finance such down payment by a loan
in ad di ti on to any other loan financing the remainder of the purchase price of the motor vehicle.

1

It further provides that it will be unlawful for
the dealer and licensee to violate any law of the state ,
of Utah now existing or hereafter enacted respecting
C(1mmerce in motor vehicles or any lawful rule or regulation respecting commerce in motor vehicles promulgated by any licensing or regulating authority
now existing or hereafter created by the laws of the
state of Utah.
1

It is unlawful for a dealer and licensee to violate
any of the terms and provisions of the motor vehicle
act or any of the rules and regulations promulgated
the administrator under the authority granted
him.

1

It provides for record keeping pertaining to
e\·ery motor vehicle which is bought, or exchanged by
the dealer and licensee or which is received or accept·
ed by the licensee for sale or exchange. He must keep
records of every used part or used accessory which is
bought or otherwise acquired. He must keep records '
of every motor vehicle which is bought or otherwise
acquired and wrecked or dismantled by him. He is
prohibited from knowingly purchasing, selling,
transporting, dismantling or otherwise acquiring,
disposing of or handling a stolen motor vehicle.
1

6

These are some of the pertinent prohibitions
and acts of omission which shall constitute an unlawful act or violation of the act for a dealer to do.
Under Section 41-3-8, Utah Code Annotated
1953, as amended, the administrator has the right
from time to time to promulgate, amend and repeal
such reasonable rules and regulations, not inconsistent with the act and laws of the state of Utah, as he
shall deem necessary, to carry out the purposes of the
act. He has broad investigatory powers.
As Mr. Burt, the administrator, testified (Tr.
368-370), his staff consists of eleven people, six who
are investigators employed in supervision and investigation of complaints; and further, in the enforcement of the provisions of the act.
Section 41-3-24, 25 and 26 sets forth procedure
as to denial of application for or revocation or suspension of a license, together with procedure of hearings with regard to denial or revocation of licenses.
Section 41-3-27 provides that violation of the
act shall constitute a misdemeanor.
The purpose of this action by appellant was to
have the Trial Court determine that Title 76, Chapter 55 is violative of certain provisions of the Constitution of the state of Utah.
In determining constitutionality, statutes are
presumed to be constitutional until the contrary is
clearly shown. This burden is upon the one, of course,
7

attacking the statute. It is only when statutes manifestly infringe upon a constitutional provision that
they can be declared void. Every reasonable presumtion must be indulged in and every reasonable doubt
resolved in favor of constitutionality. See Broadbent
·vs. Gibson, 140 P2d 939, 105 U 53 (1943).

1

We feel that this Honorable Court has enunciated in unmistakable terms the principles that must be
considered where an attack is made on the constitu- '
tionality of the statute.
We quote portions of the decision in the case of
Tmde Commission vs. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc.,
446 P2d 958 (Utah 1968):
"An alleged violation of the Constitution
must be of a specific provision of a particular
article therefore. We have repeatedly held in
order to be declared unconstitutional, the statute m'USt clearly violate some constitiitionol
provision, and fu..rther, the violation must be
clear, complete and unmistakable."
"The first is that the legislature of the
state is not a government of powers limited to
those expressly granted, as is the federal government, (as the federal Constitution says, b.ut
is gradually being eroded away). The legislature of the state, which represents the people
and thus the sovereign, has all of the residuum
of power of government, except only as expressly restricted by the Constitution. Jn
to preserve the independence and the integrity
of the three branches of government, it is of
the utmost importance that the judicial
cise restraint and not intrude into the leg'!Sla8

tive pre1'ogative. It cannot strike down and
nullify a legislative enactment unless it is
clearly and exp1·essly prohibited by the Constitution or in violation of some plain mandate
thereof. The court niust make every reasonable presumption which favors constitutionolity. The courts have a duty to investigate and,
insofar as possible, discover any reasonable
avenues by which the statute can be upheld.
Every reasonable doubt must be resolved in
favor of the constitutionality of the statute.
Those who assert the invalidity of the statute
nmst bear the burden of showing it to be 101constitutional."
" * * *It does not lie within the p1·ovi11ce
of the court to pass upon the wisdom, the need
or the desirability of any legislation, nor to
choose between two opposing political philosophies. It is not the function of the court to ameliorate the conditions of those in want, nor is
its purpose to solve the economic, social or religious problems and dissensions which beset
society. The court is not the conscience of the
State or its people. It does not fall within its
duty to express the personal desires or philosophy of its personnel."
"The court must voluntarily restrain itself by holding strictly to an exercise and expression of its delegated or innate power to
interpret and adjudicate. We have been cal!ed
upon to state what the law is and not what H"e
think it should be. The question as to whether
the statute in question is or is not economically
sound or beneficial is not for the court to decide, but such an inquiry is a matter for the
legislature. The only question for us to to determine whether or not the particular statute
9

in question is constitutional." (Emphasis
ours)
We again refer to Broadbent vs. Gibson, supra,
and quote the following:
"The Legislature has a wide discretion in
determining what shall come within the class
of activities permitted (on Sunday) and what
shall be excluded, and in determining wether ,
such classification is constitional.
"A court is not concerned with the wisdom or policy of the law and cannot substitute
its judgment for that of legislative body, and
if reasonable minds might differ as to reasonableness of a regulation, the law must be upheld."
In the Utah case of State vs. Sopher, 71 Pac. 1
482, the Supreme Court makes the following pertinent statement:
" * * ., All presumptions are in favor of
the validity of a statute, and unless the courts
can clearly say that the legislature has erred
the act should stand, and the prerogatives of
the legislatm·e not encroached upon. Courts
may interpret, construe, declare, and apply the
law, but may not usurp the functions of the
lawmaking power by assuming to interfere
with or control the legislative discretion. * * *"
The Motor Vehicle Act (Title 41, Chapter 3)
has been in force and effect since May 10, 1949, and
new provisions and amendments have been made subsequent to its enactment, which the legislature no
doubt deemed necessary to keep pace with changing
conditions.
10

It must be recognized that the automobile has
become a definite and well-established part of our
,ray of life; its use, operation, manufacture, sale,
license, registration, taxation, insurance, theft, and
many othe1· related matters have received special
legislative recognition and attention, and particularly has this been done by the Legislature of the State
of Utah.

The Legislature of the State of Utah has treated
the motor vehicle business and the use of motor vehicles as a special type of business. No other business
has been so treated by the Legislature of the State of
Utah.
It must be remembered that the Legislature has
deemed it necessary to have in force and effect Title
41, Chapter 3, for the well-being and protection of
the public.

The Appellant in its Argument, Point I, stated
that the Trial Court erroneously ruled that the statute in question is not an unreasonable exercise of the
legislative power to regulate property rights and
business practices.
Title 41, Chapter 3, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
as amended, is a comprehensive and far reaching
regulation and restriction on the sale of motor vehicles. The public interest and welfare requires such
regulations and restrictions on the sale and use of
111otol' vehicles, as are provided in Title 41, Chapter 3.
How could it be said that the Legislature could
11

not extend those regulations and restrictions to another phase of the business of the sale of motor vehicles that it deems necessary in the public interest
and welfare?
It must be remembered that every Sunday has

been declared a legal holiday under and by virtue of
Section 63-13-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended.
We are convinced without a doubt that the classification as defined by this act under attack (Title
76) is proper and reasonable and does not violate the
due process clause of the Constitution, nor any constitutional provision of the state of Utah.
Title 76, the law under attack by the Appellant,
is nothing more than an amendment of Title 41,
Chapter 3.
Utah is not alone in enacting a statute such as
the one being attacked by the Appellant.
In the case of Diamond Auto Sales, Inc., et al vs.
Norrnan Erbe, et al, 105 NW2d 650, the issues presented to this Court were before the Supreme Court
of the state of Iowa regarding the prohibiting of the
sale of motor vehicles by dealers on Sunday. The at·
tackers' position was that the act was arbitrary and
unreasonable interference with plaintiffs' business;
that the law was not uniform in application and dis·
criminatory. These are the same arguments and ob·
jections of the Appellant. The Iowa Court made this
pertinent statement:
12

"It is elenientary that the co11rts have no

1{'ith the wisdom, justice, policy or expediency of the enactments of the legislatHre
ond may not interfere because of any s11pposcd lack of those elenients in the legislation itnder attack. This freedom from lack of responsibility for what the legislature does is at
times a comforting position f01· the judiciary,
but it has no further significant here. The
question we must determine is whether the
lawmaking body acted within its constitutional powers." (Emphasis ours)
'Ve set forth the legislative reasons for the law:
"\Ve quote the explanation: 'Licensed motor vehicle dealers are prohibited by existing
laws from selling motor vehicles which do not
meet specific safety standards and they are required to furnish the purchaser, prior to delivery of the motor vehicle, certain legal documents that are peculiar to the trade. This bill
would amend the motor vehicle dealers licensing law to protect the public:
' ( 1) from the hazards of driving in Sunday's highly congested traffic unsafe cars purchased from dealers on Sunday when mechanics are not on duty and state enforcement
agents are not available for checking dealer
lots; and:
' ( 2) from the risks of being involved in
the improper sale of a motor vehicle clue to the
of essential legal documents on
Sunday and, in some cases, protective liability
insurance. Thus thiis bill would aid the commissioner of public safety in his enforcement
of the existing motor vehicle laws.' ThE: plaintiffs introduced evidence which they think
13

showed the invalidity of the reasons given by
the legislature. But before discussing thu
phase of the question it is appropriate to point
out that we are not limited to those matters.
If any reasonable state of facts can be conceived which will support the validity of the lau·,
it is our duty to sustain it; and it is plaintiff's
duty to negative every conceivable basis for
upholding it. Dickinson vs. Porter, 240 Iowa
393, 400, 35 N.W.2d 66, 71; Eckerson vs. City
of DesMoines, 137 Iowa 452, 476, 115 N.W.
177, 187; McGitire vs. Chicago, B. & 0. Railway, 131 Iowa 340, 350, 108 N.W. 902, 905,
33 L.R.A., N.S., 706." (Emphasis ours)
The Honorable Court made other statements
very fundamental and pertinent to the matter before
us, in which it stated:
"Regularly enacted laws are presumed to
be constitutional, and this presumption must
be overcome by one attacking a statute by
proving its invalidity beyond a reasonable
doubt."
" * * * The fact that a law may work
hardship does not render it unconstitutional."
We quote further from this decision:
"Turning then specifically to the attack
on the questioned act because it unreasonably
and arbitrarily interferes with the businesses
of the plaintiffs, we must determine whether
the reasons given by the legislature or any
other conceivable state of facts, have been negatived by the plaintiffs by the required quantum of proof. Chapter 243 is unquestionably
an attempted exercise of the police power of
the state and must be sustained as such or over·
14

thrown as an arbitrary and unreasonable use
of the power. The concept of this power has
been broadened in later years. We said, in
Steinberg-Baiim & Co. vs. Countryman, supra,
at page 930 of 247 Iowa at page 19 of 77 N.\V.
2d; 'Formerly the police power was thought to
be limited to measures that promoted merely
the public health, safety or morals. Its scope is
now generally recognized as much less restricted. It has repeatedly been held to incliide at
least the promotion of prosperity and the general welfare.' (Citing authorities). It is in the
light of modern authority that we must consider the act before us. (Emphasis ours)
"The legislature said the act is needed because of the danger arising from driving motor vehicles purchased on Sunday when mechanics are not available. The plaintiffs' evidence shows that generally mechanics do not
work on Sunday. They counter this, however,
by evidence that they check all used cars coming to their lots and sell them only when they
are put in good condition for safe driving.
This, it seems to us, is a matter for the legislature to weigh. There is evidence that many
prospective purchasers of used automobiles
prefer to drive them a short distance before
buying. Perhaps they choose to have them
checked by mechanics of their own selection.
In any event we cannot say the evidence of
safety is so conclusive the legislature had no
reasonable basis for its determination at this
point.
'The legislative conclusion that danger of
fraud or mistake might arise in Sunday sales
of used cars because county recorders' offices
are not open so that title and liens can be check15

eel is likewise beyond our power to hold as an
arbitrary and unreasonable basis for the act.
All dealers in either new or used motor vehicles are i·equired to first procure licenses
from the state. Section 122.3, Code of 1958,
LC.A. But this is not a complete guarantee
against mistake, fraud or misrepresentation;
at least we cannot hold the legislature has been
proved to have been arbitrary and unreasonable in so concluding. Many vehicles are subject to conditional sales contracts, mortgages,
or tax liens of record. The Sunday buyer has
not opportunity to check this for himself; if
the legislature though he needs protection, it
is beyond our power to say it could not afford
it."
We would like to quote from the Iowa case further:
"So \Vith the question of protective liability insurance. It is the public policy of the
state, as evidenced by the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act, Chapter 321A, Code
of 1958, LC.A., that those who drive motor
vehicles upon the highways of the state shall
be able to respond in damages for the injuries
they cause through negligent or reckless operation. Commonly, the owner of a vehicle protects himself and those whom he may injure
by public liability insurance. If he does not do
so, and he inflicts injuries for which he cannot
pay, he is denied the right to operate until. he
furnishes e\·idence of financial responsibility.
The legislature assumed liability insurance
might not be readily available on Sunday, and
we cannot say this asumption has been overcome by the plaintiffs beyond a reasonable
doubt.
16

"These considerations would in themselves require a holding that the act is not an
arbitrary and unreasonable regulation of
plaintiffs' business. But other jurisdictions
have found additional reasons for upholding
similar legislation. It has been said that, because of the highly competitive nature of the
business, the high price of the article being offered for sale and the limited number of buyers, the 'unreasonable and competitive lust' of
some dealers forces all to keep their places open
every day of the week for long hours, and on
Sunday; and this is thought to be inimical to
the public welfare. Gundaker Central Motors,
Inc. vs. Gassert, 23 N.J. 71, 127 A.2d 566, 572,
appeal dismissed for want of a federal question, 354 U.S. 933, 77 S.Ct. 1397, 1 L.Ed. 2d
1533. This case was cited with approval in
Tinder vs. Clarke Auto Company, 238 Ind.
302, 149 N.E.2d 808, 815. The Indiana Supreme Court there added some observations of
its own about the need of mankind for a day of
rest at regular intervals. In both the Gundaker
and Tinder cases the courts of last resort of
New Jersey and Indiana, respectively, upheld
statutes prohibiting the sales of either new or
used motor vehicles on Sunday."
We quote further:
"Other courts have found no constitutional bar to similar statutes. Irishman's Lot vs.
Cleary, 338 Mich. 662, 62 N.W.2d 668; Mosko
vs. Dunbar, 135 Colo. 172, 309 P.2d 581; Rosenbaum vs. City and County of Denver, 102
Colo. 530, 81 P.2d 760; Stewart Motor Company vs. City of Omaha, 120 Neb. 776, 235
N.W. 332. Two jurisdictions have held to the
contrary. McKaig vs. Kansas City, 363 Mo.
17

1033, 256 S.\V.2d 815 holds such a statute unconstitutional; b11t the Missouri S11preme
Court specifically puts its holding 11pon a peculiar provision of the state constitution 1chich
made the question of whether a statute or ordinance u:as a special or general one a judicial
question. It pointed out that only three other
states - Minnesota, Kansas, and Michigan have similar constitutional provisions, and
therefore precedent from jurisdictions other
than the three 1wmed tcere of little value. 256
S.\V.2d at pages 816, 817. At that time frish100n's Lot vs. Cleary, supra, had not been decided in Michigan. It should be noted that even
with the same constiutional provision 'which
the Missouri court thm<ght decisive the Michigan Sitpreme Coi<rt, in the Iri..,hnwn's Lot
case, upheld the statute." (Emphasis ours)
We quote further :
"The second ground stated for reversal
by the plaintiffs is that the act is not universal
in its application and is discriminatory. In
fact, the contentions that an act is arbitrary
and unreasonable and that it is discriminatory
are often not greatly different. The plaintiffs
seem to recognize this by their brief, which
argues both propositions in the same
An act which is unreasonable and arbitrary is
often so because it discriminates. In the case
at bar it is urged that selling of used cars at
retail is not different from other businesses
such as those which sell furniture, groceri.es,
cigarettes, Sunday papers, pets, which furnish
taxicab or laundry service, as laundroma.ts,
travel bureaus, or which provide entertainment such as moving picture theatres or
ball games. This was the basis for the Florida
18

Supreme Court's holding in Kelly vs. Blackburn and Henderson vs. Antonacci, supra.
"But we think there is a clear distinction
and that it is pointed out by the reasons set
forth in our discussion under Division II above.
Thus, other businesses are not subject to the
need for services of, or inspection by, a qualified mechanic. The danger of mistake or fraud
arising from inability to check titles or liens
is not generally present in other businesses;
nor do the yas a rule need the protection of
public liabiilty insurance."
VVe quote further:
"The rule is thus stated in Dickinson vs.
Porter, supra, at pages 400, 401 of 240 Iowa,
at page 72 of 35 N.VV.2d: 'If there is any reasonable ground for the classifications * * * and
it operates equally upon all within the same
class, there is uniformity in the constitutional
sense and no violation of any constitutional
provision invoked by plaintiff.' Authorities in
support are cited immediately following. Nor
is it sufficient that the court may regard the
reason for the classification as weak, or poor,
or that the differences upon which it is based
are not great or conspicuous. Dickinson vs.
Porter, supra, at page 401of240 Iowa, at page
72 of 35 N.VV.2d; 16 A C.J.S. Constitutional
Law§ 520, page 382."
VVe quote further :
"So, although our Sunday 'blue laws' have
been repealed and citizens generally are permitted to carry on their businesses or vocations
on that day without prohibition by our statutes, as plaintiffs point out, we think there is
a sufficient basis for the classification made
19

by. the_ legi.sla_ture in the ac.t here challenged to
brmg it w1thm the protection of the foregoing
i·ules. * * * "
We would like to refer this Honorable Court
to the case of Tinder vs. Clarke Auto Co., Inc., 149
NE Rep. 2d 808. In this case a Sunday closing law
for automobile dealers was held constitutional. We
would like to refer the Court to certain statements
made in this case by the Supreme Court of Indiana,
which are as follows :
'The making of classifications in exercise
of police power is matter of public policy and
in the first instance it is province of legislature to determine what classifications are reasonable in view of purpose to be accomplished,
and the Supreme Com-t may not substitute its
judgment on such question for that of legislature, unless calssification is so manifestly arbitrary as to leave no room for reasonable
minds to differ on the subject. Const. art. 1, §
23; art. 4, §§ 22, 23."
"Statute subjecting automobile dealers,
who engage in business of buying, selling and/
01· exchanging motor vehicles at retail on Sundays, to fines and/or imprisonment greater
than that imposed upon that of other businesses which are made unlawful by general Sunday closing law, is not unconstitutional on g"round that characteristics of
retail automobile business are not distinctive from auto sales of automobiles, selling
of real estate and farm machinery, or grocery
store, drug store and filling station businesses,
and classification was not arbitrary and unreasonable. Burns' Ann. St. § 10-4301, }04305; Const. art. 1, § 23; art. 4, §§ 22, 23.
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"Legislature is vested with power and responsibility of declaring public policy with regard to exercise of police power of state, and if
persons adversely affected by acts of legislature consider laws enacted to be ill conceived,
unreasonable or oppressive, they should seek
relief from legislature and could not call upon
courts to invalidate laws, if laws are rightfully
enacted within scope of legislative authority."
We refer the court to the case of Gundaker Centml Motors, Inc., vs. Gassert, 127 A2d 566, upholding
a New Jersey statute prohibiting the sale of motor
vehicles on Sunday. The court made the significant
statement that the fact that the sale of motor vehicles
as singled out for legislative treatment is no grounds
for complaint if there is any reasonable basis for such
action.
We feel that the following statement by the New
Jersey Court is very pertinent to the matter before
this Court:
'"The statutes in question here apply to all
automobile dealers within the State, without
distinct'ion as to class, type, location or otherwise. All are required to close. Fundamentally
then, they satisfy the initial inquiry as to equal
protection. No economic advantage can be
gained by any one within this State by reason
of the Sunday regulation because no persons
other than those covered by the enactments can
engage in the business of selling motor vehicles, R.S. 39 :10-19, N.J.S.A. Thus all motor
vehicle dealers are protected in their businesses
and no substantial loss o'f revenues can result
where the product they deal in is unobtainable
elsewhere within the State. The cars that
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would be sold on Sunday will now be sold on
other days in the week and probably to the
same prospective purchasers."
In the case of Irishnwn's Lot vs. Cleary, 62 NW
2d 668, the Supreme Court of Michigan upheld a Sunday closing law for motor vehicles. It enunciated
many of the principles that we have hereinabove set
forth.
In the case of Mosko vs. Dunbar, 309 P2d 581,
the Supreme Court of Colorado upheld a Sunday closing law for motor vehicles.
It made the significant statement that the action
of the legislature in placing motor vehicle dealers in
a classification separate and apart from merchants
in general was not arbitrary and unreasonable in
view of the fact that sales of automobiles is a special
type of business.

The court stated:
''Today the automobile has become a definite and well-established part of our way of
life; its use, operation, manufacture, sale, license, registration, taxation, insurance, theft
and many other related matters have received
special legislative recognition and attention.
Certainly the legislature has treated the motor
vehicle business as a special type of business.
The public has accepted it as such. Were we to
hold that it is arbitrary and unreasonable action on the part of the legislature to place motor vehicle dealers in a classification separate
and apart from merchants in general, it would
be to close our eyes to reality. * * * "

The Supreme Court of Colorado further made
the significant statement that under our system of
government only the legislature can enact laws, and
it is the legislature's right and duty to determine
what laws are desirable. That it is well-established
by an unbroken line of decisions of the Colorado
court, as well as the Federal courts, that it is within
the exclusive province of the legislature to determine
the necessity, expediency, wisdom, fairness and justness of the law enacted.
The Colorado court further stated that the action of the legislature in placing motor vehicle dealers
in a classification separate and apart from merchants in general was not arbitrary and unreasonable
in view of the fact sale of automobiles is a special type
of business.
It is 'fundamental that if any reasonable state of
facts can be conceived which will support the validity
of this statute under question, it is the duty of the
Supreme Court of the state of Utah to sustain it.
Further, that it is Appellant's duty to negative every
conceivable basis for upholding it. This Court cannot
substitute its judgrnent for that of the legislature as
to what it deenis necessary and reasonable for the
proper supervision, regitlation, and conduct of the
licensees required to be licensed to do business in the
state of Utah under Title 41, Chapter 3, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended.

State enforcement agents are not available for
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checking dealer lots on Sunday. On Sunday automobile mechanics are not usually available and are not
on duty. Used automobiles, as well as new cars, de- •
livered on Sunday, and which have not been checked,
can create a hazard on the highways. The chances !
for the purchasing of stolen vehicles where the in·
accessability of essential legal documents on Sunday
is present can give a greater opportunity for car
thieves to dispose of stolen vehicles. Protective liabil·
ity insurance is not as available on Sunday as it is
on a week day where insurance companies are open
for business.
!

1

It is the public policy of the state that those who
drive motor vehicles upon the highways of the state
shall be able to respond in damages for the injuries
they cause through negligent or reckless operation. ,
Commonly, the owner of a vehicle protects himself
and those whom he may injure by public liability insurance. If he does not do so, and he inflicts injuries
for which he cannot pay, he is denied the right to operate until he furnishes evidence of financial responsibility. The legislature has the righ't to assume that
liability insurance might not be readily available on
Sunday, a legal holiday.
!
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The Legislature of the state of Utah would certainly have been aware of the danger of fraud or mistake which might arise on Sunday sales of used cars
because of the closing of the office of the Tax Commission so that title liens could be checked.
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Many vehicles are subject to conditional sale
contracts or security agreements, mortgages or tax
liens of record. The Sunday buyer has no opportunity
to check this for himself. If the legislature thinks he
needs protection it is beyond the power of this Court
to say that it cannot afford to give him this protection. It certainly could be said that because of the high
competitive nature of the business, the high price of
the article being offered for sale and the limited number of buyers, the 'unreasonable and competitive lust'
of some dealers would force all to keep their places
open every day of the week for long hours, and on
Sunday. Certainly this could be inimical to the public
welfare.
It seems to us without question that Title 76,

Chapter 55, is nothing more nor less than an amendment to Title 41, extending the coverage of the motor
vehicle act, Title 41, Chapter 3, as the legislature
deemed it necessary for the protection of the public
and for its welfare. It must be remembered that the
legislature has seen fit to amend Title 41, Chapter 3
on occasions to expand its coverage, and by the enactment of Title 76, Chapter 55 has done nothing
more nor less than follow its past patterns of amending and extending coverage of the act to protect the
public and provide for its welfare in those particulars
that it, the legislature, deems necessary.
We feel that the evidence as adduced can be gene1·ally summarized as pertaining only to conditions
as they pertain to Salt Lake County. As we heretofore
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quoted from Dianwnd Auto Sales, Inc., et al vs. Nol'·
man Erbe, et al, supra, the Court, in order to sustain
the position of appellant, would have to determine that
there is no conceivable state of facts which could have
justified the legislature in its enactment of the stat11te in question. This the appellant has not done. The
evidence introduced by appellant was limited somewhat to Salt Lake County. It did not truly reflect the
conditions in the state of Utah as a whole. Even the
evidence as adduced by appellant did not apply to or
cover the various reasons the Legislature could haYe
considered in enacting the act in question.
The evidence by appellant does not negative the
required quantum of proof.
Certainly, as we have said before, this Court cannot substitute its judgment for the determination or
the reasons considered by the Legislature in justifying this type of legislation.
POINT II

The Appellant in its Argument, Point II, raises
the issue of the discrimination against the Appellant,
who is a licensed dealer, and that the act also discriminates against the product - licensed vehicles which the Appellant sells. It sets forth on page 15 of
its brief that their point is that the statute arbitrarily discriminates as to products. Further, it is likewise discriminatory in that it does not apply equally
to all persons who might sell automobiles on Sunday.
Further, it says it is discriminatory because everyone except a licensed dealer may sell on Sunday.
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We ref er this Honorable Court to the case of
State vs. Mason, 78 P2d 920, which we feel that this
Court has used as a yardstick in determining what is
a proper classification.
One of the Appellant's attacks on the statute in
question is that the same is discriminatory and unreasonable discrimination. The act before the court
on that case was Chapter 4, Laws of Utah 1935,
which required a license to be obtained by persons
other than commission merchants, who for the purpose of resale obtained from farmers possession or
control of farm products without paying cash for the
same at the time of obtaining such control or possession; that no person shall act as a commission merchant, dealer, broker, or agent without having obtained a license as provided for in the act. The act defined a dealer as any person other than a commission
merchant who for the purpose of resale obtains from
the producer thereof possession or control of any
farm products, except by payment to the producer at
the time of obtaining such possession or control, of
the full agreed purchase price of such commodity in
lawful money of the United States. The act further
provided, however, that the term "dealer" as therein
defined shall not be construed to include those who
are regularly licensed under the laws of this state to
sell tangible personal property exclusively at retail.
The defendant in the Mason case attacked the
act on the grounds it was unconstitutional, as he contended that it violated Section 7, Article I of the State
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Constitution, and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amedment to the Constitution of the United States. The
defendant Mason further contended that the specifications in the act requiring a person to take out a
license in order to buy farm products on credit or by
payment with a check, exempting those who buy for ,
lawful money of the United States or those who are
regularly licensed under the laws of the State to sell
tangible property exclusively at retail, denies the
equal protection of law and is taking property without due process of law.
Defendant Mason claimed an unreasonable discrimination in three respects: ( 1) Including in the
operation of the act those who obtained possession or
control of farm products by other than contemporaneous payment of cash and excluding those who paid
contemporaneously with cash; (2) excluding those
regualrly licensed under the laws of the State, to sell
tangible personal property ''exclusively at retail";
( 3) a discrimination in the class or group enjoying
the intended protection in that it pertained only to
farmers and excluded manufacturers and other businessmen.
The court concluded that none of the above clas·
sifications were arbitrary or unreasonable, the court
making the pertinent statement that every legislative
act is in one sense discriminatory. That the legislature cannot legislate as to all persons or all subject
matters. It is inclusive as to some class or group and
as to some human relationships, transactions, or
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functions and exclusive as to the remainder. It made
the further pertinent statement that a classification
is neve1· unreasonable or arbitrary in its inclusion
01· exclusion features so long as there is some basis
for the differentiation between classes or subject
matters included as compared to those excluded from
its operation; provided the differentiation bears a
reasonable relation to the purposes to be accomplished by the act, as we interpret it.
The objects and purposes of the law present the
touchstone for determining proper and improper
classifications. And this is a standard for determining propriety of classifications as respects question
whether statute is unconstitutionally discriminatory
and in violation of the Constitution of the State of
Utah, Article I, Section 7.
The Mason case makes the pertinent statement,
which we think is applicable here, that if a reasonable
basis to differentiate those included from those excluded from its operation can be found, the act must
be held constitutional.
The Legislature in regard to the act in question
had a definite basis or reason for the classification,
and the same seemed adequate to the Legislature. It
must be remembered, as the Mason case states, that
the judiciary cannot supplant their judgment for
that of the Legislature.
We are appreciative o'f the fact that there are
many people, judges included, who may have specific
29

economic views. These views, of course, may not influence the Court in its determination.
The Appellant alleges in its Argument, Point
II, that the statute unconstitutionally discriminates
against licensed motor vehicle dealers by requiring
them to close on Sunday and by imposing criminal
penalties for violation of the provisions of the statute.
We refer the Court to certain statements made
by the Supreme Court of Indiana in the case of Tinder vs. Clarke Aitto Co., Inc., 149 NE Rep. 2d 808:
"Statute subjecting automobile dealers,
who engage in business of buying, selling and/
or exchanging motor vehicles at retail on Sunday, to fines and/or imprisonment greater
than that imposed upon that of other businesses which are made unlawful by general
Sunday closing law, is not unconstitutional on
ground that characteristics of retail automobile business are not distinctive from auto sales
of automobiles, selling of real estate and farm
machinery, or grocery store, drug store and
filling station businesses, and classification
was not arbitrary and unreasonable. Burns'
Ann. St.§ 10-4301, 104305; Const. art. 1, § 23;
art. 4 §§ 22, 23."
It must be remembered that Title 41, Chapter 3
provides for a criminal penalty for a violation of the
act. The Legislature did nothing more nor less than
make the amendment, Chapter 76, Title 55, consistent with Title 41, Chapter 3.
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CONCLUSION
We feel that the Trial Court properly found that
the statute in question is constitutional.
The Legislature of the state of Utah by enacting
the Act in question extended the supervision and restriction of licensed motor vehicle dealers by restricting the sale of motor vehicles by licensed dealers on
Sunday. It is common knowledge that mechanics are
not on duty on Sunday, and the delivery of cars to
purchasers on that day may increase the hazard of
driving; although a car may be new, it may need
checking or brake adjustment. Turned in or used cars
should be checked for driving safety. These services
are not as available on Sundays as on other days.
State enforcement agencies are not available for
checking dealer's lots; there are risks involved in the
improper sale of motor vehicles due to the inaccessibility of essential legal documents on Sunday; and,
in most cases, protective liability insurance is not
available. Thus, this Act would aid the administrator
of the department of motor vehicle administration
under Title 41, Chapter 3, Motor Vehicle Act, in his
enforcement of existing motor vehicle laws.
It is common knowldege that many prospective
purchasers of used automobiles prefer to drive them
a short distance before buying. Perhaps they choose
to have them checked by mechanics of their own selection. This would be impossible on Sunday. The
Legislature certainly is aware of the chances of fraud
or mistake arising in Sunday sales of used cars, be31

cause the offices of the Secretary of State and the
Department of Motor Vehicles with regard to registration and filings are closed. Liens and titles cannot be checked.
We must confess that the requiring of motor vehicle dealers to close on Sunday is not a complete
guarantee against mistake, fraud or misrepresentation; however, it certainly can minimize the risks,
and the Legislature certainly had a right to do so by
the enactment of the Act in question. If the Legislature felt that the Sunday buyer, having no opportun·
ity to check titles with regard to conditional sale con·
tracts, mortgages or encumbrances of any kind or
nature, and he needed this protection, it is certainly
beyond the power of this Court to say that it cannot
do so.
The Legislature certainly has the right to assume that liability insurance might not be as readily
available on Sunday; and, therefore, for the protection of the public it is essential that those who drive
motor vehicles on the highways of this state shall be
able to respond in damages for the injuries they cause
through negligent or reckless operation; and it is almost in every instance the case that the owner of a
vehicle protects himself and those he may injure by
public liability insurance.
The Legislature has seen fit to restrict and supervise the sale and use of motor vehicles; how can it
be said that it cannot extend that supervisory power
and restrictions, by prohibiting the sale of motor vehicles on Sunday? A person who purchases a car on
32
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Sunday is certainly handicapped by the inaccessibility of protective insurance; the checking of his car
for safety by a mechanic of his own choosing; no opportunity to check records as to whether the title to
the automobile is clear. Sunday closing minimizes the
chance for fraud and mistake. Banks are not open on
Sunday, and many other aspects of normal business
services are not open and accessible to the Sunday
of an automobile is entirely
purchaser. The
different from that of any other type of personal
property, the reason for Title 41, Chapter 3. The purchase of personal property, other than motor vehicles,
does not have the elements of danger in their sale and
use as motor vehicles. Also, the amount of money inYolved is, in most instances, greater.
The administrator of Title 41, Chapter 3, and
his asistants and investigators, are not on duty and
not available on Sunday.
The Legislature has seen fit by the enactment of
Title 41, Chapter 3 to carefully supervise and scrutinize the conduct of motor vehicle dealers.
How can it be said that the Legislature should
not have the right to put another restriction on the
motor vehicle dealers in orde1· to insure better law enforcement of the provisions of Title 41, Chapter 3?
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